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 First UK experimental online survey of public perceptions of shale gas fracking.
 The public is ambivalent about shale gas, but also sees more risks than benefits.
 Demographics, politics and environmental values exert strongest influence on perceptions.
 Impact of shale gas information is greatest on attitudinally ambivalent respondents.
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a b s t r a c t
There is growing recognition of the need to understand public attitudes to energy sources, such as shale
gas, and to feed these into decision-making. This study represents the first detailed UK experimental sur-
vey of public perceptions of shale gas fracking, including analysis of the effects of different messages and
the relative influence of different audience, message and contextual factors on support and risk percep-
tions in respect of shale gas fracking. Using an online survey (N = 1457) of the UK public, we find consid-
erable ambivalence about shale gas, but also greater awareness of potential risks than benefits. Prior
knowledge is associated with more favourable attitudes, although demographics, political affiliation
and environmental values are strongest influences on perceptions. When provided with environmental
or economic information about shale gas, participants became more positive – irrespective of their prior
values or whether information is framed in terms of losses or gains. As expected, prior attitudes predict
how information is received, with more attitude change amongst the most ambivalent respondents. We
conclude that additional information about shale gas is more likely to be effective changing attitudes if
focussed on this ’undecided’ group. Studies of this type are important for policy makers and industry alike.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Economic pressures and environmental targets are leading to
significant changes to UK energy systems. DECC [1] refers to an
energy ‘trilemma’, the challenge of ensuring secure supply, at an
affordable price, while decarbonising the power system. This tri-
lemma has major ramifications for the public, who will be asked
to accept new energy infrastructure and technologies and to
change patterns of demand. Shale gas is the latest energy source
to be suggested by the UK government as providing a key
component of the nation’s energy mix, particularly in helping
reduce reliance on energy imports [2]. However, various uncertain-
ties remain surrounding the benefits and risks associated with
shale gas extraction.1
While policy-makers have stressed the energy security and
affordability benefits of shale gas, estimates of the scale of
such benefits have varied substantially [3–5]. Furthermore,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.09.004
0306-2619/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author at: School of Psychology, Park Place, Cardiff University,
Cardiff CF10 3AT, UK. Tel.: +44 2920 876972.
E-mail address: WhitmarshLE@cardiff.ac.uk (L. Whitmarsh).
1 Hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) is the process used to extract shale gas, which
involves injecting water, sand and chemicals at high pressure into the shale, cracking
it open and allowing the gas to escape. The water is then allowed to flow back to the
surface where it is collected and treated or reused.
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environmental groups have highlighted the risks associated with
hydraulic fracturing, including water contamination and induced
seismicity [6]. The Royal Society [7, see also 8] concludes the safety
and environmental risks of hydraulic fracturing are low and
manageable through best practice and enforcement of UK regula-
tions. They also recommend understanding public acceptability
of shale gas extraction and use in the context of energy, environ-
mental and economic policies be considered a priority for UK
research. Similarly, the International Energy Agency [9, p. 15]
concludes shale gas operators require a ‘social license to operate’.
These recommendations reflect high-profile public protests and
concerns about the risks associated with the technology [10,11].
Understanding public attitudes to new energy sources like shale
gas is vital for several reasons [12]. From an instrumental perspec-
tive, social acceptability can represent a major potential barrier to
developments of new energy sources and technologies, as indi-
cated by protests and moratoria on hydraulic fracturing in several
countries and US states [7]. Indeed, public opinion is seen as a
major challenge for European shale gas development [13]. There
are also strong substantive and normative arguments for consider-
ing public perceptions and values in relation to energy options:
broadening the range of perspectives included in decision-
making can lead to better and fairer decisions, and democratic
policy decisions should reflect societal views [14]. This normative
and substantive argument is particularly strong in relation to
decisions about siting of energy developments (e.g., shale gas
extraction facilities) where local communities will be directly
affected. It is therefore critical to understand public attitudes and
the bases of concern about energy technologies, and where possi-
ble feed this understanding in at an early stage in decision-
making (before attitudes become polarised and decision-makers
potentially distrusted [8,12]).
This paper examines the UK public’s attitudes to shale gas frack-
ing, including those living in areas where shale gas is being
extracted, and in areas where it could be extracted in the future.
To date, very little work has explored these perceptions, and no
experimental research has been conducted to examine the effects
of different messages and the relative influence of different audi-
ence, message and contextual factors on support for shale gas
extraction. Using an experimental online survey, we address this
research need. The following section outlines the relevant empiri-
cal and theoretical literatures; Sections 3 and 4 then describe the
survey methodology and results, respectively; and Section 5
concludes with inferences for policy.
2. Background
2.1. Attitudes to shale gas fracking
Studies of public attitudes2 to energy sources and technologies
consistently show the public favours renewable sources (e.g., solar,
wind) over fossil fuel or other sources [12,15]; and are ambivalent
about carbon capture and storage (CCS), nuclear power, biofuels,
electrification and demand management [16]. Public values underly-
ing engagement with energy system change include efficiency,
nature protection, safety, reliability, affordability, freedom, fairness,
and quality of life [16]. Consistent with this, most view fossil fuels
as polluting, outdated and finite [16].
Comparatively little work has explored perceptions of
unconventional fossil fuels, but many of the public’s concerns
about conventionals appear to apply here. In contrast to other
unconventional fossil fuels [17,18], there has been considerable
recent UK media coverage of shale gas [19], leading to relatively
high levels of public awareness. Attitudes to shale gas show con-
siderable ambivalence, however: as of June 2014, of the 74% of
the British public who have heard of it, half neither oppose nor
support it, with support and opposition each accounting for around
one-quarter [15]. US research suggests the public is positive about
the potential economic opportunities of shale gas extraction, but
not at the expense of water quality and local noise pollution and
traffic [20,21]. In the UK, concerns about shale gas initially related
to earthquakes [22] but have more recently focussed on water con-
tamination, while many also believe it represents a ‘cheap’ energy
source [11]. Women, older people, those with left-of-centre
political views, and newspaper readers appear to be particularly
concerned about the technology [11,23].
The literature to date on perceptions of shale gas fracking has
not sought to make theoretically informed predictions or explana-
tions of public responses to shale gas. However, a sizeable litera-
ture exists on attitudes and risk perception, which highlights
several technical and non-technical factors likely to predict public
views on energy sources and technologies, and explains divergence
between expert and non-expert assessment of risks [24,25]. Oltra
et al.’s [26] review of the energy siting literature categorises these
factors as: (i) characteristics of the technology (e.g., scale, waste
outputs); (ii) psychological processes (e.g. place attachment; famil-
iarity with the technology); and (iii) wider social and institutional
factors (e.g. trust, ownership, governance). Broadly, this corre-
sponds with models of communication and persuasion from the
social psychology literature, such as the Elaboration Likelihood
Model (ELM [27]), which highlight the interaction of: audience fac-
tors (e.g., level of engagement, prior knowledge, values), message
factors (e.g., framing effects3); and source and contextual factors
(e.g., trust, timing) in shaping the impact of information provision.
The current research draws on this literature to examine the
impact of audience, message and contextual factors in predicting
public responses to shale gas fracking. We consider both psycho-
logical and geographical audience factors, since attitudes to speci-
fic, local developments may diverge from attitudes to energy
technologies in principle, and individual differences (e.g., values,
knowledge, demographics) often predict energy technology atti-
tudes [12]. Critically, little previous work has examined the relative
importance of audience, message and contextual factors in predict-
ing public responses to energy technologies, or considered whether
psychological [e.g., 25,27] or geographical [e.g., 30,31] theories
might offer better explanations for these responses. While the cur-
rent research is primarily intended to provide an empirical explo-
ration of this nascent topic, a further contribution of our paper is to
offer a more conceptually integrative view on public responses to
novel energy technologies by drawing on several distinct social
science literatures (e.g., risk perception, attitude change and per-
suasion, place identity and attachment). This not only has theoret-
ical value, but can help inform the most appropriate strategy for
2 Attitudes are hypothetical constructs that refer to an individual’s evaluation of, or
orientation towards, an ‘attitude object’ (e.g., thing, person, idea). In this paper, we
also use the term ‘perception’ as a broader concept encompassing ‘risk perceptions’ (i.
e., subjective evaluation of the characteristics and severity of risk) as well as attitudes.
For a discussion of relevant theory and measurement of these concepts, see [12].
3 Message ‘framing’ refers to the selection and presentation of information through
choice of words, images, problem definition, inclusion and omission of information,
and so on, that provides context and meaning [28]. How information is framed and
questions are posed are likely to influence public views on shale gas. Compare, for
example, surveys in May/June 2014 by (a) the industry body UK Onshore Oil and Gas
[29], who provided a brief description of shale gas and its benefits including ‘to meet
the UK’s demand for natural gas for nearly 50 years or to heat the UK’s homes for over
100 years’ and found 57% supported extraction and 16% opposed it; with (b) DECC’s
[15] survey which provided no information about shale gas (relying on extant
understanding) and found, of those (74%) who had heard of it, 24% supported and 24%
opposed shale gas extraction.
420 L. Whitmarsh et al. / Applied Energy 160 (2015) 419–430
understanding and potentially overcoming divergence in lay and
expert views and involving publics in decision-making about shale
gas policy and developments. For example, claims that ignorance
about shale gas risks and benefits belie public protests and opposi-
tion [32] assume a ‘deficit model’ of risk communication, whereby
provision of accurate, scientific information is assumed to lead to
public support. This model has repeatedly been shown to be
flawed, with factors such as trust and values more predictive of
public support than knowledge [12]. Other claims that protests
are merely ‘NIMBYism’ (i.e., rejection of local developments,
irrespective of attitudes to the technology in the abstract) [33]
imply location is the key predictor of public attitudes. This paper
seeks to provide evidence to explain diverse public responses to
fracking and to inform appropriate public engagement strategies.
In respect of geographic audience factors, the literature on place
identity and attachment highlights that the relationship between
proximity to energy developments and public views is not obvious,
and undermines any assumption that communities will inevitably
reject local developments. Rather, it seems that if developments are
perceived to threaten a local area’s inherent character or identity,
they will be resisted; but perceptions of place identity vary widely
and may be compatible with industrial development [30]. Further,
communities with experience of particular industries are likely to
havedifferent views than thosewithout suchexperience. Theseexpe-
riences may be coloured by whether there are local benefits (e.g.,
employment) associatedwith the particular industry, as well as trust
in local operators and regulators [31]. Consequently, Venables et al.
[34] found that place identity, followed by trust in the nuclear
industry, were the strongest predictors of support for new local
nuclear development amongst communities living close to existing
nuclear facilities. The salience of such contextual and place-based
factors in predicting responses to fracking will be examined here.
In relation to psychological factors, the ELM particularly high-
lights the importance of audience and message characteristics
(e.g. values, prior knowledge, framing) in shaping public responses.
Importantly, audiences are not homogenous, so will respond
differently to novel information. For example, knowledge and prior
attitudes can serve to polarise views on technical issues [35]. Due
to pervasive confirmation bias (i.e., the tendency to seek out
confirmatory evidence and disregard or downplay contradictory
evidence [36,37]), attitudes can polarise as a result of reading
mixed information [38], although this effect is not uniform: those
who have not yet made up their minds about an issue or hold
mixed views (i.e., attitudinal ambivalence) will process informa-
tion in a less biased and deeper way. The role of prior knowledge,
attitudes and ambivalence will therefore be examined in the
current research. Furthermore, the way in which information is
framed interacts with audience values and beliefs, such that partic-
ular frames (e.g., environmental benefits) will only be meaningful
or persuasive for certain audiences [39].
2.2. Research questions and hypotheses
This study aimed to explore how risks and benefits of shale gas
fracking are perceived by the UK public; how these perceptions
vary by known predictors of risk perception (e.g., location, knowl-
edge, trust, values, message factors); the relative importance of key
geographical and psychological audience factors in predicting per-
ceptions; and how messages about shale gas fracking may be
received and interpreted differentially according to the audience’s
prior attitudes or values. Drawing on the literature outlined above,
we propose the following hypotheses:
H1. Both geographical and psychological audience factors, includ-
ing gender, environmental attitudes, location, and place attach-
ment, will predict shale gas attitudes and risk perceptions.
Specifically, males, those living in areas with extant fracking, those
with lower place attachment, and those with lower environmental
values will be more positive about shale gas.
H2. Prior knowledge will influence shale gas attitudes. Specifi-
cally: those with more knowledge will have stronger attitudes –
both positive and negative – towards shale gas.
H3. Prior attitudes will influence response to shale gas informa-
tion. Specifically, those who are most ambivalent will experience
the greatest attitude change when given information.
H4. There will be an interaction between message (benefit frame)
and environmental values. Specifically, those with higher environ-
mental values will be more influenced by the environmental
benefit frame than the economic benefit frame.
3. Methodology
3.1. Design
Following a series of in-depth public interviews (reported
elsewhere), an online survey was conducted during August 2014 to
investigate factors predicting shale gas acceptability and the impact
of different information frames. Using a 2  2 design, participants
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, in which the infor-
mation provided on shale gas was varied (see below).
3.2. Participants
Participants (N = 1457) were drawn from a UK online market/-
social research panel. We sampled three regions: one where shale
gas fracking has already commenced (Lancashire, focussed on
Weeton, Elswick, Roseacre Wood, Preston New Road, Westby,
Banks4; 32%); one with potential for (but so far no exploitation of)
shale gas fracking (South Wales, focussed on Pontrhydyfen, Cwma-
fan and Llandow; 34%5); and one where there are no shale deposits
(Mid/North Wales, including neighbouring English towns; 34%). A
demographic breakdown of the sample is shown in Table 1. In terms
of political preferences, this is broadly representative of the UK
public6; demographically, the sample is somewhat older and better
qualified than the general public.7
3.3. Measures and materials
The questionnaire’s first section included location and
demographic measures (see Table 1), followed by baseline
(pre-information) measures (item order within each scale was
randomised to avoid order effects):
 Place attachment: adapting previous scales [40,41], a 12-item
measure (a(12) = .826) included items assessing place attach-
ment along general (e.g., ‘The place where I live is very special
to me’), social (e.g., ‘I believe my neighbours would help in an
4 This region (PEDL 165) has been granted a gas extraction license under the
Petroleum Act 1998: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at-
tachment_data/file/391803/Landfields_Lics.pdf. There is an active gas field here that
was fracked in 1993. Cuadrilla have since fracked one well (in 2011), drilled several
appraisal wells, conducted geophysical surveys and installed microseismic arrays.
5 This region includes PEDLs 100, 148, 149, 214–220.
6 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data.
7 2011 census data shows 11.9% are 16–24; 6.8% are 25–34; 20.5% are 35–44; 19.4%
are 45–54; 6% are 55–64; and 8% are 65–74. In terms of highest qualifications, 23.2%
have no qualifications; 29.3% have GCSE/O-Levels; 12.1% have A-Level/Higher/BTEC;
5.1% have vocational/NVQ; and 27% have a degree or higher.
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emergency’) and natural (e.g., ‘I would feel less attached to my
area if the native plants and animals that live here disappeared’)
dimensions, with response options on a five-point scale from
Strongly agree (5) to Strongly disagree (1).
 Environmental identity: a two-item measure (a(2) = .858),
adapted from [42], included the items: ‘I think of myself as
someone who is concerned about the environment’; and ‘Being
environmentally-friendly is an important part of who I am’,
with responses again on a five-point agreement scale.
 Climate change scepticism: A 14-item scale (a(14) = .950),
adapted from [38], was used to assess beliefs about the reality,
causes and impacts of climate change and views on the reliabil-
ity of climate change evidence and information sources (e.g., ‘I
do not believe climate change is a real problem’; ‘Claims that
human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated’)
again on a five-point agreement scale.
 Knowledge about energy sources and technologies: Participants
indicated how much they knew about exemplar energy
sources/technologies: gas (also known as ‘natural gas’); coal;
shale gas or ‘fracking’; underground coal gasification; carbon
capture and storage; nuclear power; offshore wind power; solar
photovoltaic/solar energy; and bioenergy on a five-point scale
of ‘A lot’ (5), ‘A fair amount’ (4), ‘A little’ (3), ‘Nothing – have
only heard the name’ (2), and ‘Nothing – have never heard of
it’ (1).
 Favourability of energy sources and technologies: Participants
provided a personal evaluative assessment of the exemplar
energy sources/technologies with the item ‘how favourable or
unfavourable are your overall opinions or impressions of the
following energy options currently’ on a five-point scale of ‘Very
favourable’ (5) to ‘Very unfavourable’ (1).
 UK energy budget: Support at national level for the exemplar
energy sources/technologies was elicited with: ‘What propor-
tion of the UK’s budget for energy do you think should be
invested in supporting each of the following?’ with a total
budget of 100% to be assigned to each option.
 Risks versus benefits of shale gas: A multiple-choice item
(‘From what you know or have heard about using shale gas
fracking in Britain, on balance, which of these statements
most closely reflects your own opinion?’) with seven
response options from ‘The benefits of shale gas fracking
far outweigh the risks (1)’ to ‘The risks of shale gas fracking
far outweigh the benefits (5)’ (plus ‘None of these (6)’; ‘Don’t
know (7)’ not used in regression analyses) measured per-
ceived risks/benefits of shale gas.
 Attitudes to shale gas fracking: 13 items (adapted from
[11,43,44]) assessed attitudes to shale gas fracking, including
dimensions known to predict risk perceptions, such as trust in
regulators (e.g., ‘I feel confident that the British Government
will adequately regulate shale gas fracking’), concern about
risks (e.g., ‘I am concerned about the risks of earthquakes from
shale gas fracking’), perceptions of benefits (e.g., ‘Shale gas is a
clean energy source’) and moral hazard (e.g., ‘If politicians think
shale gas fracking is a possibility, it will make them less likely to
pursue other policies to tackle climate change’). Again, a five-
point agreement scale was used. A further item asked ‘Do you
think that in the next 20 years, shale gas fracking will... improve
our lives (1); . . . make our lives worse (1); . . . make no differ-
ence either way (0); Not sure (9).
 Attitudinal ambivalence towards shale gas fracking: A three-item
measure (a(3) = .842), adapted from [45], assessed ambivalence
(e.g., ‘I have mixed feelings about shale gas’; ‘I am undecided
about shale gas’).
 Acceptance of shale gas extraction: Participants were asked
‘Should shale gas extraction be allowed in the UK?’ with ‘Yes’,
‘No’, or ‘Don’t know’ as response options.
 Perceptions of public acceptance: In addition, participants were
asked ‘What percentage of the UK public do you think would
agree that shale gas extraction should be allowed in the UK?’
with numeric responses permitted from 0 to 100.
 Preferences for locating shale gas extraction: Using a UK map of
shale gas deposits (from [46]), participants were asked where
they thought ‘shale gas fracking should take place by clicking
Table 1
Demographic breakdown of sample.
%
Gender
Female 56.9
Male 42.6
Missing 0.5
Age
16–24 4.3
25–34 11.9
35–44 13.8
45–54 19.4
55–64 27.7
65–74 20
75 or over 3
Missing 0.1
Highest qualification
No formal qualifications 5.9
GCSE/O-Level 21.5
A-Level/Higher/BTEC 19.2
Vocational/NVQ 17.4
Undergraduate degree 22.6
Postgraduate degree 12.1
Missing 1.2
Highest science qualification
No formal qualifications 23.1
GCSE/O-Level 44.3
A-Level/Higher/BTEC 12.9
Vocational/NVQ 5.2
Undergraduate degree 9.7
Postgraduate degree 4.1
Missing 0.7
Political party most likely to support
Conservative 22.0
Labour 28.2
Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) 4.7
Green Party 3.5
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 11.8
British National Party (BNP) 0.5
Scottish National Party (SNP) 0.1
Welsh Nationalist Party/Plaid Cymru 4.1
Democratic Party 0.1
Other 0.5
Undecided 15.3
Would not vote 5.9
Prefer not to say 3.2
Missing 0.1
Rurality
Urban 25.7
Sub-urban 39.2
Rural 34.4
Missing 0.7
Years living in this area
Less than 1 year 2.8
1–3 years 7.7
4–6 years 10
7–10 years 9.3
More than 10 years 69.9
Missing 0.3
Employment in energy industry
No 94.0
Yes, in the past 3.6
Yes, currently 1.9
Missing 0.5
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on a region once for places you think it should occur, or twice
for places that you think it should not occur’. Six regions could
be selected: Marros Group; Weald Basin; Gainsborough Trough;
Bowland Shale; Upper Cambrian Shales; and Liss Shale. If
respondents did not feel extraction should occur in any of these
locations, they were asked to select this option below the map
(‘I do not think shale gas fracking should occur anywhere’).
After this, information was provided about shale gas fracking.
We varied the information that was provided, such that there were
four experimental conditions: two texts focussed on economic
benefits and two on environmental benefits; for each, the informa-
tion was either framed in loss or gain terms [47]. The information
gave a short description of shale gas fracking (see Appendix A)
followed by an environmental/economic and loss/gain8 benefit
framing:
 Conditions 1–2: Economic gain [loss]: ‘‘One of the main benefits is
that fracking could generate substantial quantities of gas in the
UK, contributing to energy self-sufficiency. This means that
widespread extraction of shale gas across the UK could reduce
household energy bills. [This means that, without widespread
extraction of shale gas across the UK, households could face
higher household energy bills].”
 Conditions 3–4: Environmental gain [loss]: ‘‘One of the main
benefits is that, as natural gas burns more cleanly (releasing less
CO2 and other pollutants) than other fossil fuels, it is considered a
viable alternative to coal and oil. This means that widespread
extraction of shale gas across the UK could help reduce climate
change. [Thismeans that,withoutwidespread extraction of shale
gas across the UK, we could see increased climate change.]”
After reading the text, participants were asked ‘What thoughts
came to mind when you were reading the text’ (open-ended) to
ensure message elaboration. A manipulation check confirmed the
manipulation was largely successful.9 Finally, several shale gas per-
ception measures were again administered to examine any impact of
the information provided: Shale gas favourability; Shale gas risks
versus benefits; and two of the shale gas attitude statements (clean,
cheap) which most directly related to the information provided.
4. Results
4.1. Knowledge and favourability of energy technologies/sources
Most respondents claimed to know only ‘a little’ about most of
the technologies (Fig. 1). Participants were most familiar with coal,
followed by natural gas, nuclear, wind and solar; and least familiar
with CCS and underground coal gasification (UCG), both scoring
highly for ‘never heard of it’.
Turning from knowledge to attitudes, participants rated solar
energy as most favourable, followed by offshore wind (Fig. 2). Other
technologies were rated considerably lower. UCG and CCS were
consistently rated as ‘neither favourable nor unfavourable’, a likely
reflection of the lack of knowledge about them. Shale gas was rated
most unfavourable, followed by nuclear. However,more participants
rated shale as ‘neither favourable nor unfavourable’ than any other
option, with ambivalence also high for bioenergy and nuclear.
Consistent with personal favourability ratings, when asked to
allocate a national energy ‘budget’ for the different energy
sources/technologies, the highest proportion was allocated to off-
shore wind and solar (Fig. 3). However, personal favourability
and preferences for national budget are not entirely consistent.
Along with natural gas, nuclear was also rated fairly high – perhaps
reflecting a ‘reluctant acceptance’ that this technology is necessary
despite its risks. UCG and CCS were allocated the least in the bud-
get allocation exercise, perhaps more reflecting lower knowledge
than disapproval. Correlations (see Supplementary Material)
between favourability and UK budget assignment show respon-
dents were consistent in their responses – i.e., energy options with
highest favourability ratings were given higher percentage of UK
energy budget.
4.2. Attitudes to shale gas fracking
When asked to rate the risks and benefits of shale gas, almost a
quarter of participants (24.8%) answered ‘don’t know’ to this
question. However, more seem to feel that the risks outweigh the
benefits, than vice versa (Fig. 4), with water contamination and
earthquakes amongst the most commonly identified risks
(see Table 2).
When asked whether they felt shale gas would make a differ-
ence to their lives in the next 20 years, almost half of participants
indicated they were unsure. The remaining responses were fairly
evenly distributed across making their lives better, no difference
and worse. Similarly, when asked whether widespread shale gas
extraction should be allowed in the UK, the highest proportion
(40%) of participants indicated they did not know; while 31%
responded affirmatively (Fig. 5). In respect of perceived public
acceptance of shale gas, responses ranged from 0% to 100% with
a mode of 30% (7.7% of all participants selected this amount). The
mean estimate was 37.4% – which compares with 31.1% of the
sample who actually agreed that shale gas extraction should be
allowed in the UK (i.e., participants’ estimates of public opinion
are reasonably accurate). However, consistent with the false con-
sensus effect [48], disaggregating by opinion, we found that those
who said it should be allowed estimated 50.6% of the public would
agree; while those who did not think it should be allowed only
estimated 29.8% of the public would agree. This difference is signif-
icant (t(844) = 15.5, p < .001).
For the mapping exercise, respondents were asked to indicate
whether they thought shale gas should be extracted (‘like’) or not
(‘dislike’) in UK regions where deposits have been identified. As
shown in Fig. 6, most participants were neutral for each region,
while the smallest percentages selected ‘dislike’. Higher propor-
tions selected dislike for the shales closest to them.10 However,
almost half of participants (42.8%) selected ‘I do not think shale
gas fracking should occur anywhere’.
8 We found virtually no differences between loss/gain frames, so the results
discussed here focus only on comparing the environmental versus economic framing.
9 Participants were asked: ‘Which of the following was mentioned in the
information you read?’ with response options: ‘Widespread extraction of shale gas
could increase climate change’; ‘Widespread extraction of shale gas could increase
energy bills’; ‘Widespread extraction of shale gas could reduce climate change’;
‘Widespread extraction of shale gas could reduce energy bills’. The results indicate
most respondents had read the text: 81.3% in condition 1 and 79.3% in condition 2
correctly selected ‘Widespread extraction of shale gas could reduce energy bills’;
while 59.8% in condition 3 and 62.5% in condition 4 correctly selected ‘Widespread
extraction of shale gas could reduce climate change’ (v2(9, N = 1427) = 468.86;
p < .001). While the proportion of incorrect responses was somewhat higher in
conditions 3 and 4, it is noteworthy that most of these selected the bill reduction
option (i.e., the economic benefit), while very few in any conditions selected the two
risk-related response options.
10 For example, 18.1% in South Wales selected ‘dislike’ for the Marros Group,
compared to 13.3% in Mid/North Wales & Midlands and 11.1% in Lancashire v2(4,
N = 1437) = 20.57, p < .001. In Lancashire, 18.2% selected ‘dislike’ for the Bowland
Shale, compared to 16.3% in Mid/North Wales & Midlands and 11.8% in South Wales
v2(4, N = 1437) = 20.93, p < .001. In Mid/North Wales & Midlands, 9.3% disliked the
Cambrian Shales, compared to 5.3% in South Wales and 4.3% in Lancashire v2(4,
N = 1437) = 13.67, p = .008. With respect to the Lias Shale, 12.7% selected ‘dislike’ in
Mid/North Wales & Midlands, while 11.8% did in South Wales and 10.1% in Lancashire
v2(4, N = 1437) = 14.60, p = .006. There were no significant differences for Gainsbor-
ough Trough and Weald Basin.
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4.3. Knowledge analysis
We found a non-linear relationship between (self-assessed)
knowledge and shale gas favourability, but not indicating polarisa-
tion in the expected direction: those who claimed to have no
knowledge and those claiming to have high knowledge of shale
gas had the most favourable attitudes (Fig. 7; F(1, 4) = 3.16,
p = .01). Furthermore, perceptions of risks versus benefits were
much higher for those claiming to have no knowledge of shale
gas (F(1, 4) = 3.70, p = .01). Following information provision,
however, the relationships between knowledge and shale gas
perceptions disappear: favourability (F(1, 4) = .91, p = .46); risk
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versus benefits (F(1, 4) = .46, p = .77). There was no statistically sig-
nificant relationship between knowledge and acceptance of shale
extraction F(1, 4) = 1.26, p = .28).
4.4. Location analysis
Fig. 8 shows differences in attitudes between the three regions
surveyed (i.e., Lancashire, South Wales and Mid/North Wales &
Midlands). Shale gas favourability showed a significant relation-
ship with location F(2, 1434) = 4.95, p = .01 (but see Section 4.5).
Participants from Lancashire (i.e., where fracking has been ongoing
for some years) rated shale gas as a more favourable energy source
(M = 2.77, SD = 1.14) than those from Mid/North Wales & Midlands
(M = 2.54, SD = 1.12) where fracking is not viable, a statistically
significant mean difference of M = .22, 95% CI[0.05, 0.40], p = .01.
There was also a marginally significant relationship between
viewing shale as a ‘cheap’ energy source and respondents’ location:
Welch’s F(2, 941.56) = 2.60, p = .075. Participants from Lancashire
rated shale gas as a cheaper energy source (M = 3.13, SD = .99) than
those from Mid/North Wales & Midlands (M = 3.00, SD = .853), a
difference of M = 0.13, 95% CI[0.01, 0.27], p = .085). Similarly,
there was a statistically significant relationship between seeing
shale as clean and location F(2, 1422) = 3.53, p = .03. Participants
from Lancashire rated shale gas as a cleaner (M = 2.92, SD = .93)
than those from Mid/North Wales & Midlands (M = 2.78,
SD = .85), a statistically significant difference of, M = .145, 95% CI
[0.00, 0.29], p = .04.
Consistent with the more favourable attitudes amongst those in
Lancashire, we also found a statistically significant relationship
between location and shale risk perceptions F(2, 1422) = 7.08,
p = .001. Participants from Mid/North Wales & Midlands rated
shale gas as more risky (M = 4.40, SD = 2.03), than those from
Lancashire (M = 3.93, SD = 2.06) a statistically significant difference
of, M = .467, 95% CI[0.15, 0.79], p = .002. Participants from South
Wales rated shale gas as more risky (M = 4.33, SD = 2.12), than
those from Lancashire (M = 3.93, SD = 2.06) a statistically signifi-
cant difference of, M = .41, 95% CI[0.08, 0.73], p = .008.
4.5. Relative importance of demographic, value, location and
knowledge factors
While we found location correlated with shale attitudes, other
factors (e.g., sector of employment) may be driving these effects.
Consequently, we ran regression analyses of the dependent
variables (DVs) to examine the relative influence of location and
other place-based audience factors, relative to attitudinal, value,
knowledge and demographic variables. As shown in Table 3, males,
those with higher science education, Conservative voters, urban
Table 2
Attitudes to shale gas fracking.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Mean SD
I am concerned about the risks of water contamination from shale gas fracking 19.4 31.4 36 9.6 3.6 3.53 1.02
Producing energy from shale gas will reduce reliance on foreign energy sources 13.5 33.4 42.4 7.3 3.4 3.46 0.93
If politicians think shale gas fracking is a possibility, it will make them less likely to pursue other
policies to tackle climate change
13.1 31.7 45.1 8.4 1.7 3.46 0.89
I am concerned about the risks of earthquakes from shale gas fracking 13.2 27.2 38.7 14.9 5.9 3.27 1.06
Producing energy from shale gas will ensure a reliable source of energy for the UK in the future 9 23.8 47.8 12.3 7 3.16 0.99
Shale gas is a cheap energy source 5.7 20.3 53.4 14.1 6.5 3.05 0.91
When people find out about shale gas fracking, it will reduce their motivation to make changes
in their own behaviour to tackle climate change
5.1 16.7 58.2 15.7 4.3 3.03 0.84
Producing energy from shale gas will reduce the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions 2.7 15 57.9 16.5 8 2.88 0.85
Producing energy from shale gas will reduce energy bills 4.3 16.6 48.9 18.7 11.4 2.84 0.98
Shale gas is a clean energy 3.1 14.8 54.2 18 10 2.83 0.91
I feel that current rules and regulations are sufficient to control any risks from shale gas fracking 3.7 16.2 42.5 21.5 16.1 2.70 1.04
I feel confident that the British Government will adequately regulate shale gas fracking 4.6 18.1 35.4 22.8 19.1 2.66 1.11
Knowing shale gas fracking is a possibility makes me feel less inclined to make changes in my
own behaviour to tackle climate change
2.3 5.4 46.4 29.6 16.3 2.48 0.91
Fig. 6. Preferred locations for shale gas extraction.
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residents, those more attached to place, those with lower environ-
mental identity and those with higher climate scepticism scores
were more favourable towards shale gas.11 Political affiliation and
climate change attitudes were the strongest predictors. However,
location was no longer a significant predictor, suggesting that the
effects described above were associated with other factors.12
When different types of predictors are grouped according to more
geographical (e.g., location, employment in energy sector) versus
psychological (e.g., knowledge, environmental identity, attitudes)
audience factors, they account for very similar levels of variance
(Fig. 9), with attitudinal/value and knowledge variables together
accounting for 18% and place-based/geographical factors for 16%.
4.6. Information framing (experimental component)
We next examined the impact of different forms of information
provision on shale attitudes. We first included environmental
identity as an additional independent variable (IV), as we expected
from previous work [38] that people who considered themselves to
be ‘green’ would perceive the information differently to those who
do not.
As shown in Fig. 10, favourability towards shale gas changed
after information provision F(1, 1414 = 129.68, p < .001, partial
g2 = .084. Participants rated shale gas as more favourable post-
information (M = 2.91, SD = 1.20) compared to pre-information
(M = 2.67, SD = 1.13).13 There was also a significant impact of
information on perceptions of shale gas as a ‘cheap energy source’,
F(1, 1405) = 84.87, p < .001, partial g2 = .058. Participants rated
shale gas as cheaper post-information (M = 3.24, SD = 1.02) than
pre-information (M = 3.05, SD = 0.91).14
Similarly, there was a statistically significant impact of informa-
tion on seeing shale as a ‘clean energy source’ F(1, 1394) = 300.01,
p < .001, partial g2 = .177. Participants rated shale gas as cleaner
post-information (M = 3.19, SD = 1.03) than pre-information
(M = 2.83, SD = .92). There was a significant main effect of environ-
mental identity, F(1, 1394) = 5.25, p = .022, partial g2 = .004.
Participants with low environmental identity rated shale gas
as cleaner than those with high environmental identity both
pre- (Low, M = 2.96, SD = .81; High, M = 2.70, SD = .98) and
post-information (Low, M = 3.28, SD = .92; M = 3.09, SD = 1.13).
In respect of risk perceptions, there was a statistically signifi-
cant influence of information F(1, 1410) = 113.59, p < .001,
partial g2 = .075. Participants rated shale gas as less risky/more
beneficial post-information (M = 3.75, SD = 1.98) compared to
pre-information (M = 4.22, SD = 2.08).15
Next, we included prior attitudes (favourability) as an IV, along
with condition, to explore the possible effects of attitude polarisa-
tion. While we found prior attitudes (recoded as a median-split
binary variable) exerted a main effect on post-information favoura-
bility F(1, 3) = 1031.07, p < .001, there was no interaction effect
with condition F(1, 3) = .32, p = .808. Similarly, prior attitudes
exerted a main effect on post-information risk perceptions
F(1, 3) = 941.44, p < .001.16 There was also a main effect on both
perceptions of shale as clean F(1, 3) = 332.89, p < .00117; and shale
as cheap F(1, 3) = 275.52, p < .001.18
Finally, we included ambivalence as an IV, along with condition,
to see whether those more ambivalent changed attitudes more
than those with firmer beliefs [49]. This showed significantly
greater attitude change amongst the more ambivalent respondents
– specifically, less risk perception F(1, 3) = 4.09, p < .05,
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Fig. 7. Relationship between self-assessed knowledge and (a) shale gas favoura-
bility, (b) shale gas risk perceptions, and (c) acceptance of shale gas extraction.
Fig. 8. Perceptions of shale gas across different locations.
11 Similarly, acceptance of extraction of shale across the UK was higher for males,
those with higher levels of science education, higher scepticism, and lower
environmental identity, as well as those with higher place attachment (see
Supplementary Information).
12 Indeed, those living in Lancashire are more likely to vote UKIP (15.1%) and
Conservative (24.0%) than those living elsewhere (10.3% and 21.0%, respectively;
v2(12, 1455) = 43.78; p < .001). Those living in Lancashire also have lower environ-
mental identity (M = 3.49, SD = .95) than those living elsewhere (M = 3.70, SD = .95; t
(1449) = 3.89; p < .001); they also have higher climate change scepticism (M = 2.96;
SD = .91) than those living elsewhere (M = 2.78; SD = .87; t(1448)=3.49; p < .001).
There were also more males (51.1%) in the Lancaster sample than elsewhere (38.9%;
v2(1, 1449) = 19.16; p < .001); and a lower proportion in Lancashire living in rural
areas (23.6%) compared to those living in other regions (39.9%; v2(2, 1447) = 37.57;
p < .001). There was no significance in science education or place attachment between
regions.
13 There were no statistically significant differences between conditions F(3, 1414)
= .62, p = .603, nor by environmental identity F(1, 1414) = 1.988, p = .114.
14 This did not vary between conditions F(3, 1399) = 1.22, p = .302, nor by
environmental identity, F(1, 1399) = 1.342, p = .247.
15 There were no significant differences between conditions F(3, 1410) = 1.28,
p = .279 nor by environmental identity F(1, 1410) = .003, p=.958.
16 However, there was no interaction effect with condition F(1, 3) = .96, p = .413.
17 However, there was no interaction with condition: F(1, 3) = 1.10, p = .35.
18 However, there was no interaction with condition: F(1, 3) = 1.15, p = .33).
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Regression analysis of favourability towards shale gas.
B Std. Error Beta t B Std. Error Beta t B Std. Error Beta t B Std. Error Beta t
1 (Constant) 2.37 0.12 19.41*** 2.54 0.17 15.29*** 0.51 1.15 0.44 0.36 1.16 0.31
Gender 0.33 0.07 0.13 4.82*** 0.31 0.07 0.13 4.48*** 0.22 0.07 0.09 3.30*** 0.22 0.07 0.09 3.20***
Age 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.03 1.06 0.04 0.02 0.05 1.65 0.04 0.02 0.05 1.69
2 Education 0.06 0.03 0.08 2.31* 0.05 0.03 0.06 1.84 0.04 0.03 0.05 1.73
Science education 0.08 0.03 0.09 2.80** 0.09 0.03 0.10 3.21*** 0.09 0.03 0.10 3.13***
Knowledge of shale gas/fracking 0.05 0.04 0.04 1.28 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.59 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.86
Environmental identity 0.08 0.04 0.06 2.15* 0.11 0.04 0.09 2.90***
Climate scepticism 0.27 0.04 0.20 6.70*** 0.25 0.04 0.19 6.26***
Politics_conservative 2.24 1.12 0.77 2.00* 2.30 1.12 0.79 2.06*
3 Politics_labour 1.65 1.12 0.62 1.48 1.71 1.12 0.64 1.53
Politics_libdem 1.85 1.13 0.33 1.64 1.91 1.12 0.34 1.70
Politics_green 0.98 1.13 0.15 0.87 1.07 1.13 0.16 0.95
Politics_UKIP 1.89 1.12 0.50 1.68 1.96 1.12 0.52 1.75
Politics_plaidcymru 1.68 1.13 0.28 1.50 1.74 1.12 0.29 1.55
Politics_undecided 1.69 1.12 0.51 1.51 1.77 1.12 0.53 1.58
Politics_wouldnotvote 1.48 1.13 0.29 1.31 1.60 1.12 0.31 1.43
Politics_other 1.85 1.13 0.31 1.64 1.92 1.13 0.32 1.71
4 Location_SWales 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.27
Location_NEngland 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06
Length of residence in area 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.13
Rurality 0.09 0.04 0.06 2.17*
Employed in energy industry 0.17 0.10 0.04 1.70
Place attachment 0.14 0.05 0.07 2.59**
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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relative influence of different audience, message and contextual
factors on support for shale gas extraction. Our survey of three
UK regions revealed relatively low levels of knowledge about
energy technologies, although respondents (who were slightly
older and more qualified than the UK public as a whole) were most
familiar with coal, natural gas and nuclear power. Consistent with
previous research [11,15], most people had heard of shale gas or
fracking. In terms of favourability, renewables were seen most
favourably, while other technologies were rated considerably
lower – again, consistent with previous research [12]. Interestingly,
shale gas was the most unfavourable of the technologies, followed
by nuclear, although the largest proportion of respondents rated
shale gas as ‘neither favourable nor unfavourable’.
Despite the lower level of favour afforded to fracked shale gas
relative to other options, both attitudes and risk perceptions in
respect of shale gas do show considerable ambivalence, confirming
previous work [11,15].20 One-quarter of participants answered
‘don’t know’ about the risks versus benefits of shale gas fracking.
However, one-quarter also indicated that the risks far outweigh
the benefits – double the proportion who said the benefits far
outweigh the risks. In respect of most attitude statements, a large
proportion selected ‘neither agree nor disagree’, highlighting
considerable public uncertainty about shale. However, many express
doubts about the government’s ability to adequately regulate shale
gas, and there is concern about the risk of water contamination from
fracking (cf. [11]). Almost half of participants were not sure whether
shale gas would make a difference to their lives in the next 20 years;
and 40% did not know if widespread shale gas extraction should be
allowed in the UK. Participants have few preferences on where shale
gas extraction should occur, many stating that it should not occur
anywhere.
Comparison of survey responses by location showed, as
expected (H1), that those living in a region where shale gas
extraction is already underway (Lancashire) were significantly
more positive than those living where shale gas fracking is not
viable. However, these location differences disappear when con-
trolling for demographic and value factors. Rather, political affilia-
tion and attitudes to climate change, as well as gender, rurality,
place attachment and environmental identity, appear to be more
important predictors of shale gas attitudes (cf. [11]). As expected
(H1), males and those with lower environmental concern were
more positive about shale gas; although contrary to expectations,
those with higher place attachment were also more positive. The
latter is an unexpected finding that merits qualitative follow-up.
While the current research was intended foremost as an empir-
ical exploration of an emerging energy topic, a significant contribu-
tion of the paper was to integrate geographical and psychological
perspectives on energy communication, by comparing the relative
importance of place-based versus attitudinal, value and knowledge
factors. Each accounted for around half the variance, highlighting
the importance of examining both sets of factors in future
audience research. Of course, this distinction is rather arbitrary and
non-inclusive; future work might focus on exploring interactions
and causal pathways through different predictor variables (e.g.,
sector of employment, shale knowledge and climate attitudes) as
well as additional predictor variables.
Contrary to expectations (H2), we found that knowledge did not
polarise attitudes. Rather, thosewith the highest prior knowledge of
shale gas had the most favourable attitudes. However, we acknowl-
edge that ourmeasure of knowledge in this studywas self-assessed,
and that future work could compare this with more ‘objective’
knowledge measures. On the other hand, as expected (H3) and
consistent with previous work [49], prior attitudes predicted how
information was received. We found that attitudinal ambivalence
interacted with change in attitudes after reading the information:
specifically, there was greater attitude change (becoming more
favourable) amongst the more ambivalent respondents.
When provided with information about shale gas, participants
became more positive – in most cases this was irrespective of
whether environmental or economic benefits were highlighted.
Contrary to expectations (H4), environmental identity did not
interact with message framing; that is, the environmentally-
framed message did not resonate any more with those with higher
environmental concern than with other people.
5.2. Conclusion and implications
Our results are consistent with other recent studies that show
the UK public is ambivalent about shale gas, although there
appears to be greater awareness of the risks than the benefits.
However, the public is highly heterogeneous in relation to shale
gas attitudes: prior knowledge appears to be associated with more
favourable attitudes, although demographics and environmental
values are overall strongest influences on perceptions. Recognising
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Fig. 11. Influence of ambivalence and information framing on shale gas perceptions.
20 It is likely that the research design of the survey is responsible for the lower level
of ambivalence found relative to the DECC public attitudes tracker [15]. The latter is a
longitudinal survey tracking UK public attitudes on seven energy-related topics,
whereas the present survey is specific to fracking, probing in depth and with the use
of variously framed information.
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this heterogeneity is important for effective engagement
with different audiences; for example, those with strong pro-
environmental values are likely to be difficult to persuade of the
benefits of shale gas unless shale gas can be successfully framed
as relatively environmentally benign.
In the present study, providing information about a particular
benefit (economic or environment) of shale gas in general made
attitudes more positive, particularly amongst those who are the
most ambivalent. It is this undecided group who will be most
susceptible to persuasive information, be this from pro- or
anti-fracking sources.
When related to relevant theoretical and policy debates around
engaging publics with novel energy technologies, these findings do
not undermine the deficit model to the extent that other work on
related issues, such as climate change, does [50]. Evidently, there is
an important role for information provision, but other factors such
as values, play at least as important a role in attitude formation. On
the other hand, our findings are consistent with other work on
NIMBYism [30], which calls into question any straightforward
relationship between location and public attitudes.
Future work should include longitudinal analysis pre- and
post-development of energy infrastructure to explore the process
and mediators of attitudinal change. There is also considerable
scope to examine attitude change by varying the media, source
and framing of shale gas information. In terms of news media
representation of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas, comparative
international work is also likely to be instructive: the limited data
available highlights national differences that merit further investi-
gation [51]. Work should also focus on the role of trust in govern-
ment, which recent deliberative work (and communication theory)
indicates is likely to be critical for public acceptance [37].
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Appendix A. Experimental text (Economic gain condition)
On the next screen, you will see some information about shale
gas fracking. Please read the information carefully as you will be
asked some questions about it afterwards:
The UK government has announced that it wants to see the
widespread extraction of shale gas across the UK. Shale gas is a nat-
ural gas that forms within a particular type of rock, formed from
clay and other minerals. This rock is known as ‘shale’. To extract
gas from the shale, a process called ‘hydraulic fracturing’ is used
(known more commonly as ‘fracking’). Water, sand and chemicals
are injected at high pressure into the shale, cracking it open and
allowing the gas to escape. The water is then allowed to flow back
to the surface where it is collected and treated or reused. The gas
can then be collected and burnt in a power plant to generate
electricity. When finished, the sand that has been injected fills
and stabilises the cracks in the rock. Shale gas could increase global
gas reserves by over 40%.
There are both benefits and drawbacks associated with shale
gas fracking. One of the main benefits is that fracking could gener-
ate substantial quantities of gas in the UK, contributing to energy
self-sufficiency. This means that widespread extraction of shale
gas across the UK could reduce household energy bills.
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.
09.004.
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